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Abstract
We develop a model in which agents choose whether to achieve self-esteem through work.
When they do, they develop an intrinsic motivation to eﬀort. Depending on the characteris-
tics of the job to be Þlled, an employer may try, or not, to encourage this intrinsic motivation
by an adequately designed contract. Although equally productive, assuming that agents from
distinct socio-demographic groups diﬀer in their propensity to achieve self-esteem through
work, this may lead to unequal access to employment. We analyze the consequences of
this model on labor market outcomes. The model can give an account of many important
traits of socio-demographic disparities in the labor market (notably of vertical occupational
segregation).
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1 Introduction
People are in search of self-esteem: some of their actions respond to the need to have an enhanced
self-image. Here is the core result of social psychology that Akerlof and Kranton (2000) take
up (and widely document) to motivate the introduction of identity into economic analysis.1
They show that taking this motivation into account allows a better understanding of some
behaviors embedded into the social context, without departing from the individualistic paradigm.
Employment relations are good example of the kind of social situation the understanding of which
can be improved by such an approach.2 Indeed, it is quite sensible to deem that the exchange
of labor for wages should not be reduced to a purely economic transaction. From a working
persons point of view, a job can embody much more than a simple source of income: it can be
a signiÞcant channel for self-esteem.3 Our point is that this mere fact may shed light on some
aspects of labor market outcomes.
More precisely, taking the need for self-esteem as a motivation for a working persons be-
havior, this paper studies its consequences on the issue of socio-demographic disparities in the
labor market.By these terms, we mean all phenomena reßecting diﬀerentiated individual expe-
riences in the labor market, depending on non-productive features such as gender, race, or age.
In particular, our point is about socio-demographic occupational segregation, and the gaps in
average pay between socio-demographic groups.
In the following, we basically look at a Principal-Agent model in which we introduce self-
esteem motives through identity building. Let us display the main characteristics of our approach
in more detail. Our analysis of the employment relation comes within the framework of a stan-
dard Principal-Agent model with limited liability. We successively consider cases with complete
information about eﬀort (jobs whose monitoring is costless), and with moral hazard (jobs whose
monitoring is not cost-eﬀective). Indeed, it will be seen that moral hazard appreciably aﬀects
the conclusions of our analysis regarding labor market outcomes. Following Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2000), we tackle issues of self-esteem through identity building. Let us recall the broad
outlines of their modeling. Self-esteem derives from the assertion of an identity. Each agent
1 It is worth noting that reference to identity concerns is not such a recent trend in the economic literature.
McCrate (1988) recalls Sens and Hirschmans observation that people have tastes not just about external objects
or other people, but also about themselves: in other words, about their identities. Identity is what these authors
have called a "metapreference" or "value." McCrate insists that we do struggle regularly with ourselves over who
we are and who we want to be: we have second order preferences, for instance, concerning such fundamental
issues as manhood or womanhood.
2For some accounts about the limits of standard analyses of employment relations, see Bewley (1999).
3For a review of the sociopsychological experiments supporting this assertion, see Haslam (2001).
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declares himself as belonging to some abstract social category. Possible categories are associ-
ated with diﬀerent ideal attributes and prescribed behaviors. Exhibiting individual traits close
to the ideal attributes associated with ones category facilitates a sense of belonging (and hence
access to self-esteem); following corresponding behavioral prescriptions aﬃrms ones self-image
i.e. increases self-esteem, while violating them evokes anxiety and discomfort in oneself.
What are the trade-oﬀs that feed our results? In our analysis, beyond their decision to expend
eﬀort, agents choose between achieving self-esteem through their job or through other activities
outside the workplace. In terms of identity, they choose between a workplace identity and an
out-of-the-workplace identity.4 When holding the workplace identity, agents have an intrinsic
motivation to make an eﬀort at work to the extent that it conditions their self-esteem (workplace
identity involves an eﬀort prescription). Employers have an obvious interest in this choice: an
intrinsic motivation to make an eﬀort may allow them to reduce the required extrinsic incentives.
The identity decision of an agent is assumed to depend on the characteristics of the job oﬀered
by the principal but also on pay. Hence, the principal can inßuence the agents choice by oﬀering
wage amounts which meet the standards of the workplace identity (social status concern).
Yet, as suggested above, other factors condition an individuals decision to achieve self-
esteem through work: the distance from their personal traits to ideal attributes. Exhibiting
particular non-productive traits may make the holding of the workplace identity more or less
easy (comfortable). As a consequence, when choosing to encourage the workplace identity, the
principal will target agents who exhibit traits that most easily Þt into the workplace identity:5
a selective hiring6 will occur on this criterion.
4Among the four facts documented by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), we then mostly focus on two: 1) that
people have identity-based payoﬀs derived from their own actions; 2) that some people may choose their identity.
This latter point is carefully documented in their paper. Yet further a reference deserve attention. Surveying
the Þndings of the Social Identity Theory, Ashforth and Mael (1989) mention studies asserting that an individual
(consciously or not) identiÞes with a social category to enhance self-esteem. In her analysis of the domestic sexual
division of labor, McCrate (1988) focuses on individuals choice of identity. She states that: "women [...] choose
to learn to prefer mothering over auto mechanics [because] the expected payoﬀ is higher."
5Those whose characteristics are the closest to ideal attributes deÞning the workplace identity.
6 In the perspective of our model which put forward the role of work motivation, we will refer to the socio-
demographic diﬀerences in hiring experiences as selective hiring (on socio-demographic criteria) rather than hiring
discrimination. Indeed, from an economists point of view, hiring discrimination occurs when two individual with
similar productive features do not have an equal chance to get a job as a result of diﬀering socio-demographic
belonging. Our approach suggests that such belonging can aﬀect the productive features of workers: employers
preference for some socio-demographic group over another is not, stricto sensu, discriminatory. We will thus refer
to selective hiring (understood, on socio-demographic criteria).
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Our main focus is therefore on issues of socio-demographic disparities in the labor market.
However, to the extent that it is a key element of our contribution, we start with analysing how
agents concerns about self-esteem aﬀect the proÞtability of eﬀort. Because job characteristics
matter, the option for the principal to encourage the workplace identity may or not lead to some
gains in the proÞtability of eﬀort (compared with the standard case). We give a condition on jobs
characteristics such that these gains are feasible for the employer. As regards selective hiring,
this Þrst result leads to conditions of their occurrence: these conditions involve in particular the
degree of demands of the job under consideration. This is a Þrst step towards a full and intuitive
characterization of the set of jobs for which hiring might be selective. Once this characterization
is available, it becomes possible to draw some conclusions about the earnings disparity between
social groups. As far as jobs whose monitoring is costless are concerned, we show that the
share of jobs for which hiring is selective is an increasing function of the wage standard under
consideration. We then investigate the impact of moral hazard over previous results. While
the set of jobs for which eﬀort is induced obviously shrinks, one observes a stronger propensity
from the principal to encourage the workplace identity. This has appreciable implications over
the set of jobs for which hiring is selective as well as over the properties of the model regarding
socio-demographic earnings disparities. The relation between the proportion of jobs for which
hiring is selective, and the wage standard under consideration is no longer necessarily monotonic:
under some circumstances, selection may be less likely in better paid jobs.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have already tackled the problem of occupational segregation
stressing gender association with diﬀerent types of work. This approach focuses on identity
externality: a woman performing a "mans job" provokes anxiety in her male co-workers. In the
remaining, we do not assume this kind of externality, and develop arguments that go beyond
gender association with diﬀerent jobs. Akerlof and Kranton (2003) apply their model of identity
to the analysis of work incentives. They consider workers who think of themselves either as
part of the Þrm or as outsiders. When identifying with the Þrm, employees experience a loss
in utility when not following its interests. So their main focus is on organizations ability
to motivate their employees through identiÞcation. Our approach diﬀers from theirs in two
respects. First, we assume the organization is not able to change agents identity except through
a change in its compensation schedule: aspects of corporate culture are not considered. Second,
contrary to their rather radical approach to the identities available to workers (insider identity
or outsider identity) which departs from strict individualism, we take up identities picked out
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by contemporary psychologists which preserve the integrity of employees preferences.7
We think of our contribution in two parts. The Þrst is to provide a model of how self-
esteem, as a motive for behavior, aﬀects the employment relation: it leads us to focus on
the role of job characteristics in the optimal designing of contracts. The second is to provide
an alternative (or complementary) explanation to phenomena which challenge the dominant
theories: seeming hiring discrimination and unequal earnings between socio-demographic groups.
It is generally admitted that mainstream theories of discrimination do not do well in explaining
lasting earnings disparities in the labor market. As Arrow (1998) states, if, as involved by most
taste-based theories of discrimination, prejudiced employers make lower proÞts, competition
should drive them out of the market. As regards statistical discrimination, it is often argued that,
in the absence of real gaps in productivity between socio-demographic groups, recourse to such
observables as race or sex in hiring decisions should disappear.8 In our model, employers fully
observes workers productivity, and selective hiring goes with gains in proÞtability (therefore,
our explanation should be competition-proof). As a theory of selective hiring, our model leads to
a special kind of occupational segregation which provides a potential explanation of disparities
between average earnings of diﬀerent socio-demographic groups. Hence, it is consistent with
the central evidence - see Blau and Kahn (2000), Holzer (1998) - that pervasive diﬀerences in
occupational patterns are primarily responsible for persistent diﬀerences in earnings.9
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains evidence gathered by psychologists
about self-esteem achievement through work, and an informal exposition of our hypotheses
regarding preferences. Section 3 displays our model of employment relations. Section 4 is de-
voted to the exposition of our results under complete information about eﬀort, and Section 5
to the impact of moral hazard on these results. Section 6 provides a discussion of our con-
tribution with regard to issues of hiring discrimination and unequal average earnings between
socio-demographic groups, and concludes.
2 Psychological backgrounds
Identities are deÞned by a number of prototypical features abstracted from individuals.10 From
extensive analyses of typical ways of behaving and feeling in the working life, social psychology
has gathered a sum of information, and reconstituted a set of identities which develop in the
7 In our approach, employees do not identify with the Þrm.
8See Cain (1986).
9A more detailed discussion of our contribution is provided in section 6.
10For some references about the ideal-typical method, see Ashforth and Mael (1989).
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workplace.11 In this section, among documented facts, we stress those that seem the most
relevant from an economic perspective, and organize them to Þt into the framework proposed
by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). This leads us to deÞne two identities: the workplace identity
and the out-of-the-workplace identity.
2.1 Typical attitudes and feelings in the workplace
Industrial psychologists draw attention to workers who easily assert themselves within the or-
ganization.12 Such individuals are found to carry weight in the work groups decisions. Their
initial training is generally highly regarded, and the competences they claim recognized.13 Fo-
cusing on the topic of professional training, observers describe a particular zeal from this kind
of worker for participation in training sessions that improve their mastery of the organizations
activities. These workers easily declare that their job is an important part of their life. Typ-
ical proÞles are: professional workmen, employees whose promotion is based upon seniority,
technical experts, executives or managers. In contrast, observers draw attention to individuals
who hardly diﬀerentiate themselves in the work group: the latter generally have poor personal
access to power, and little autonomy in the execution of job tasks. Psychologists stress that
these individuals give their job a purely practical value insofar it allows them to beneÞt from
material rewards.14 One can list typical proÞles: young workers whose skills are considered
as inappropriate, women (particularly mothers) employed in jobs considered as unimportant,
recent immigrants or socially disadvantaged persons. More generally, all situations involving
strong commitments outside the organization may predispose to such attitudes towards work.
Behind these observations lies Kanter (1977)s argument that workers with few opportunities
to advance at work tend to seek satisfaction outside work as a way of achieving a sense of eﬃcacy
and worth. Conversely, workers who have many opportunities in the job tend to consider work
more central to their lives.
11For a survey, see Haslam (2001).
12See, for instance, the detailed observations of Sainsaulieu (1977).
13See Dubar (1992).
14Ashforth and Mael (1989) mention investigations in the Þeld drawing the conclusion that "people working at
menial jobs in a bank often distanced themselves from their implied identity (e.g., This is only a stopgap job; Im
trying to save enough to start my own business)."
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2.2 Workplace or out-of-the-workplace identity: behavioral prescriptions and
ideal attributes
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) refer to the fact that women can choose either to be a career woman
or a housewife. On the bases of previous accounts, we would like to extend this perspective by
deÞning two identities: the workplace and the out-of-the-workplace identity. Although clear-cut,
Gecas and Seﬀ (1990) show that this distinction was relevant (they regard work and home as
two meaningful contexts of self-evaluation) and fruitful.
If an agent deÞnes himself as a workplace identity holder, we will assume that he derives
self-esteem from: the adherence of his actions to a prescription of eﬀort (he must be zealous);
the scope associated with his job; the social recognition this job brings him.15 The Þrst two
points deal with prescriptions deÞning the workplace identity. Thereby, an agent will comfort-
ably claim this identity (and enjoy self-esteem through his job) when exerting a not too low
level of eﬀort at work, otherwise, he will feel some discomfort in himself.16 The scope of a job
refers to the autonomy, self-direction, and personal access to power that come with this job.17
The third point makes explicit the link between self-esteem and social status as emphasized by
social psychologists.18 This justiÞes our assumption that an agent holding the workplace identity
is susceptible to social recognition as revealed by good pay: if his wage is too far below some
exogenous standard, the agent will feel discomfort as he will see it as a drop in social status.19
This assumption is already current in the economic literature with diﬀerent underlying justiÞ-
cations.20 As for the ideal attributes deÞning the workplace identity, following the insights of
15 In support of this assumption, Gecas and Seﬀ (1990) found that when work was a central aspect of mens
self-concept, occupational variables (occupational prestige, control at work) were more strongly related to self-
esteem than when they were not; similarly, when home was important, home variables (control and satisfaction
at home) were strongly related to self-esteem.
16Lobel and St. Clair (1992) show that individuals with salient career identities were willing to expend extra
eﬀort at work. Less speciÞcally, they provide evidence on how identity salience motivates attitudes and behavior
in support of an identity.
17For some references about the "motivational" properties of the scope associated with a job, see Dodd and
Gangster (1996) who give the main conclusions of the Job Characteristics Approach. For the link between scope
at work and self-esteem, see Gecas and Seﬀ (1990). Falk and Kosfeld (2004) provide some behavioral Þndings.
18See Rosenberg and Pealin (1978) as a seminal reference or, again, Gecas and Seﬀ (1990) who explore the link
between social class and self-esteem.
19See Fershtman and Weiss (1993). Bewley (1999, Chp21, p. 432) writes : "The insult eﬀect occurs because
workers associate pay with self-worth and recognition of their value to the company." Ashforth and Mael (1989)
mention studies that show how comparisons with others aﬀect an individuals self-esteem.
20As a seminal reference, see Akerlof and Yellen (1990). For some behavioral evidence supporting the relevance
of relative payoﬀ concerns see Clark and Oswald (1996).
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social psychology, we can assume that they involve: education (experiencing self-esteem at work
may require having an educational background which is seen as appropriate); age (it is harder to
experience self-esteem through work when too young as one may be viewed as inexperienced or,
when too old, to be out-of-date); gender (through stereotypes21); strong out-of-the-organization
commitments. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) suggest adding race to this list.
The self-esteem associated with the out-of-the-workplace identity is assumed not to depend
on any features of ones working life.22 There exists a huge variety of Þelds in which one can
achieve self-esteem as well as a large variability in the amounts diﬀerent individuals may expe-
rience. This heterogeneity will not be taken into account in the sequel, and we will take the
self-esteem of an agent holding the out-of-the-workplace identity as a Þxed exogenous. As far as
ideal attributes are concerned, one will have to keep in mind that, in our dichotomic approach to
social identities, the out-of-the-workplace identity is deÞned relative to the workplace identity.
Hence, ideal attributes associated with the workplace identity can be regarded as negative, in
terms of self-esteem, when considering the out-of-the-workplace identity and vice versa.
This was a statement of the evidence at the root of our analysis. We now formally state the
corresponding assumptions.
3 Identity building, and the employment relation
In this section, we display the framework of our analysis.
3.1 Eﬀort and production
Let us consider an agent (he) characterized by an exogenous parameter θ ∈ {0, 1} (for instance
his gender or the color of his skin), and identifying with c ∈ C.23 He can exert an eﬀort
e ∈ {0, 1}. Exerting eﬀort e implies a disutility24 equal to ψ (e) with normalisation ψ (0) = 0
and ψ (1) = ψ > 0. The utility of the agent is assumed to be separable between: the utility
he derives from his wage, the disutility of his eﬀort, and his neutral self-esteem, that is the
personal gratiÞcation he derives from his job for a neutral 0 transfer - which is actually the
reservation transfer. If he receives a transfer w from the principal (she) and experiences the
21Akerlof and Kranton (2000) focus on these stereotypes. Dubar (1992) asserts that: "the workplace identity
is marked by male stereotypes just as the out-of-the-workplace identity is marked by female stereotypes".
22See the Þndings of Gecas & Seﬀ (1990) already mentioned.
23The identity held by the agent is an endogenous of our model.
24 In the sequel, we will always take it as characterizing the job rather than as a subjective parameter.
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neutral self-esteem Ic (e; θ), his global utility is given by
Uc (w, e; θ) = uc (w)− ψ (e) + Ic (e; θ)
where uc (.) is an increasing function such that uc (0) = 0. We clarify in what follows how
self-esteem concerns may inßuence the utility derived from a given wage.
Production is stochastic, and the eﬀort of the agent aﬀects the production level as follows:
the stochastic production level q can only take two values
©
q, q
ª
with q − q = ∆q > 0. We
will denote q =
¡
q, q
¢
. The stochastic inßuence of eﬀort on production is characterized by the
probabilities Pr ( q = q| e = 0) = π0 and Pr ( q = q| e = 1) = π1 such that π1 > π0. We will
denote π = (π0, π1), and ∆π = π1 − π0.
3.2 Self-esteem and identity in the workplace
Two identities. The agent has the choice between two identities: C = {A,B}. Identity A
corresponds to the workplace identity while identity B corresponds to the out-of-the-workplace
identity. An agent considering himself as an A extracts his self-esteem from: (a) the appropri-
ateness of his trait θ to the ideal attribute deÞning A (that we Þx to 1), (b) the extent of his
scope within the organization φ ∈ R+,25 (c) the fact of complying his eﬀort e to the prescription
deÞning category A (that we also Þx to 1), (d) the appropriateness of his wage to the exogenous
standard wA prevailing among A agents. As we said above, this latter assumption aims to cap-
ture the idea that social status - which we suppose to be revealed (at least partially) through
the amount of w - fuels self-esteem.26
An agent whose identity is B extracts his self-esteem from activities outside the organization.
As a consequence, we will consider this level IB > 0 as exogenous.
The form of the agents preferences according to his identity. Assuming the agent
is risk-neutral, the material utility derived from a transfer w will simply amount to w. This
material utility is obviously a component of uc (w) whatever c ∈ {A,B}. However, it may not
encompass the whole utility derived from a transfer w. Indeed, taking into account self-esteem
concerns, we assume
25 In fact φ can include any characteristics of a job entering positively in the identity A holders utility but not
in that of B holders.
26For individuals holding the workplace identity, wA is what they proudly consider as the worth of their
productive contribution. They experience the case w < wA as a negative public signal.
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uc (w) + Ic (e; θ) =
 w + φ− γw (wA − w)− γe (1− e)− γθ (1− θ) if c = Aw + IB if c = B
where γw, γe, and γθ are positive parameters. As a consequence, for all w > 0 : uA (w) =
(1 + γw)w > uB (w) = w while
IA (e; θ) = φ− γwwA − γe (1− e)− γθ (1− θ)
which involves a perfect substitutability between the various ways to Þt into the workplace
identity.
What if the agent is an outsider? The reservation wage is Þxed to 0 so that an outsiders
only source of utility consists in his self-esteem. It amounts to IB > 0 for an identity B holder.
The self-esteem of an outsider holding identity A amounts to −γwwA − γe − γθ (1− θ) < 0.
Indeed, the agent is then deprived of the main factor making identity A: a job.
We will denote γ = (γw, γe, γθ) and refer to (IB, wA,γ) as an agents self-esteem concerns.
Although it enters agents utility, φ and ψ must be understood as objective measures character-
izing a job rather than an agent. φ stands for the scope attached to the job while ψ measures
how demanding this job is. In the remaining sections, we will refer to the pair (φ, ψ) as some
job characteristics.
3.3 The contracting game
Timing of decisions and information. The timing of the contracting game is the following:
1) the agent and the principal learn the agents trait θ ∈ {0, 1}; 2) the principal oﬀers a contract;
3) the agent accepts or refuses the contract, chooses his identity, and exerts an eﬀort or not; 4)
the outcome q is realized; 5) the contract is executed.
With moral hazard, the agents level of eﬀort is not directly observable by the principal (a
fortiori non-veriÞable). The principal can only oﬀer a contract based on veriÞable variables.
We assume identities are non-veriÞable. Hence, with moral hazard, contracts are functions
w (q, θ) linking an agent with trait θs compensation to the random output q. With two possible
outcomes q and q, the contract can be deÞned, whatever θ, by a pair of transfers (w (θ) , w (θ)).27
27Under complete information, since e is veriÞable, it can be included into a contract enforced by a benevolent
court of law. We will denote we (θ) and we (θ), e ∈ {0, 1}, the transfers under complete information.
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Principals set of actions, and payoﬀs under limited liability. The risk-neutral (with
respect to transfers) principals expected utility is written as
Ve = πe (S (q)− w) + (1− πe)
¡
S
¡
q
¢− w¢ with e ∈ {0, 1}
where S (.) is assumed to be a strictly increasing function. We denote ∆S = S (q)−S ¡q¢. In the
sequel, when talking about job technology, we will refer to the triplet (π,q, S (.)) characterizing
this job. If the principal does not induce the participation of the agent, we assume that she gets
0.
Note that the principal only pays attention to the identity adopted by the agent in as far
as it may modify the expected transfer: she tries to encourage the identity that will make its
holder exert the desired level of eﬀort for the least (expected) cost. This aspect diﬀerentiates
our approach from taste-based theories of discrimination.
The assumption that the agents liability is limited is written: w ≥ 0 and w ≥ 0.28 In the
remaining, we will denote w = (w,w).
Agents set of actions. Let a denote the agents answer to the contract w oﬀered by the
principal: a ∈ {in, out}, a = out meaning remaining an outsider, a = in meaning taking the
oﬀer and becoming an insider.29 An action of the agent is a vector (a, c, e) ∈ A where30
A = {(out,B, 0) , (out,A, 0) , (in,B, 0) , (in,A, 0) , (in,B, 1) , (in,A, 1)}
Given the agents payoﬀ, it is straightforward to observe that strategy (out,A, 0) is strictly
dominated by (out,B, 0) whatever w: an outsider will always hold identity B obtaining a utility
IB > 0.
Principals problem with moral hazard. Assuming that it is a best choice for the principal
to induce eﬀort e = 1, with obvious writings, her problem is written as
max
w
π1 (S (q)−w) + (1− π1)
¡
S
¡
q
¢− w¢
subject to 
EUA (w, 1; θ) ≥ EUA (w, 0; θ) (ICA)
EUA (w, 1; θ) ≥ EUB (w, 0; θ)
¡
ICA/B
¢
EUA (w, 1; θ) ≥ IB (PCA)
28Under complete information, limited liability states that ∀e ∈ {0, 1} , we ≥ 0 , and we ≥ 0.
29Do not confuse the "out-of-the-workplace" identity with the fact of being an outsider nor the "workplace"
identity with the situation of being an insider.
30For example, (a, c, e) = (in,B, 0) stands for "accepting the contract, becoming a B without exerting eﬀort".
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OR 
EUB (w, 1; θ) ≥ EUB (w, 0; θ) (ICB)
EUB (w, 1; θ) ≥ EUA (w, 0; θ)
¡
ICB/A
¢
EUB (w, 1; θ) ≥ IB (PCB)
AND
w ≥ 0 (LL)
Among previous constraints, one will immediatly recognize the standard moral incentive and
participation constraints. The only supplement compared with the standard case comes from
the necessity for the contract to meet a crossed incentive constraint. This latter constraint aims
at preventing the agent from possibly changing his identity (and thereby his preferences) with
the intention of exerting e = 0. This requirement is particularly stringent when the principal
is to maintain the workplace identity (A), and we will see that the corresponding constraint,
denoted
¡
ICA/B
¢
, plays a crucial part in our results.
4 ProÞtability and selective hiring in jobs whose monitoring is
costless (observable and veriÞable eﬀort)
This section is both a Þrst step in our analysis, and a benchmark for the case with moral hazard.
As a Þrst step, it raises the question of the consequences of an agents caring about self-esteem
over employment relations for jobs whose monitoring is costless.
Notation Let us denote ∆I (φ; θ) = IB − IA (0; θ) = IB − φ+ γwwA + γe + γθ (1− θ) ≶ 0.
∆I is the relative (neutral) self-esteem of an identity B holder compared with that of an
A exerting eﬀort e = 0. It is the relevant variable in all the results that follow.31 Indeed, as
regards self-esteem concerns, ∆I will capture the relative reservation utilities of the identities
A and B facing the contract oﬀered by the principal. The higher ∆I, the stronger A holders
(relative) reservation, and the weaker Bs (relative) reservation.
In the sequel, as far as ∆I is concerned, we will focus successively on the roles of φ and θ.
4.1 Job characteristics, self-esteem concerns, and the proÞtability of eﬀort
Optimal contracts. In the following claim we describe the equilibrium of the contracting
game under complete information. We denote E1w∗1 the lowest expected transfer inducing e = 1
31This echoes our dichotomic approach to identity as far as working life is considered.
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when eﬀort is veriÞable. It is useful to have in mind what prevails in the standard case: in the
absence of a workplace identity, the lowest expected transfer ensuring eﬀort e = 1 is ψ.
Claim 1 Let (φ,ψ) characterize a job (whose monitoring is costless) which the principal might
like to be Þlled, and (IB, wA,γ) an agents self-esteem concerns. Under complete information,
with limited liability,
E1w
∗
1 (θ) =

max
n
ψ−γe
1+γw
; 0
o
if ∆I (φ; θ) ≤ 0
max
n
ψ−γe+∆I(φ;θ)
1+γw
; 0
o
if 0 < ∆I (φ; θ) ≤ γwψ + γe
ψ > 0 otherwise
and eﬀort e = 1 is induced if and only if E1w∗1 (θ) ≤ ∆π∆S. When eﬀort is not induced by the
principal (e = 0), participation requires a transfer of 0, and she keeps inducing it if and only if
E0S ≥ 0. Otherwise, the job is left unÞlled.
Proof. See the appendix.
Under complete information, the principal can punish the agent for exerting e = 0. However,
the limited liability constraint prevents her from reducing transfers below 0. This implies that
incentive constraints can be active, although eﬀort is veriÞable. To give an intuitive commentary
on the previous claim, let us distinguish three types of jobs from the expression of the minimal
transfers they require.
DeÞntions Given (IB, wA,γ), an agents self-esteem concerns, a job will be said to be:
 strongly fulÞlling if its characteristics (φ, ψ) are such that the crossed incentive con-
straint
¡
ICA/B
¢
is relaxed in the optimum;
 weakly fulÞlling if its characteristics (φ, ψ) are such that the crossed incentive con-
straint
¡
ICA/B
¢
is binding in the optimum;
 unfulÞlling if its characteristics (φ, ψ) are such that the crossed incentive constraint¡
ICA/B
¢
is violated in the optimum.
The more fulÞlling a job, the lower the workplace identity (A) relative reservation. We
comment on the claim in terms of decreasing identity A relative reservation (decreasing ∆I)
starting from ∆I > γwψ + γe.
32 Jobs under consideration are then unfulÞlling and it would
require a relatively high compensation from the principal to induce the agent to develop an
intrinsic motivation. Since these jobs are not that demanding, it is a best choice for her not
to seek stimulating such added motivation i.e. to let the agent hold the out-of-the-workplace
32Assuming γe < ψ, but also that it is proÞtable for the principal to induce eﬀort e = 1.
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w=(ψ −γe+ ∆I)/(1+γw)
∆π∆S
w=(ψ −γe +∆I)/(1 +γw)
w=ψ
∆π∆S
(∆I −γe)/γw
∆I ≥ γw∆π∆S+γe
ψ
(∆I −γe)/γw∆π∆S
e*=1
c*=B
e*=0
c*=B
(1+γw)∆π∆S− ∆I +γe(∆I −γe)/γw
w=ψ
ψ
(∆I −γe)/γw
e*=1
c*=B
e*=1
c*=A
e*=0
c*=B
γw∆π∆S+γe > ∆I (>γe)
Figure 1: Eﬀort proÞtability and self-esteem concerns (for jobs whose monitoring is costless).
identity: the latter receives a full compensation for the "objective" disutility ψ attached to
the job. Such is no longer the case once the job becomes weakly fulÞlling. Indeed, it is then
demanding enough for it be proÞtable for the principal to stimulate intrinsic motivation. But
this intrinsic motivation is paradoxically strongly dependent upon transfers: the self-esteem
provided by the job mostly responds to the social status concerns it meets. When strongly
fulÞlling, beyond its compensation, the job is then appealing in itself, for the self-esteem its
characteristics feed. Social status concerns are now dominated by "pure" intrinsic motivation
responding to the (relatively) high scope the agent beneÞts from in his work.
Motivation-based gains in proÞtability. Here we would like to contrast the results of our
model involving a workplace identity, with those of the standard model (in which agents can only
hold identity B) in terms of proÞtability. It turns out that eﬀort proÞtability is not necessarily
improved by workplace self-esteem concerns. Recall that, in the standard model, eﬀort e = 1 is
induced if and only if ψ ≤ ∆π∆S.
Implication 1 Self-esteem concerns extend the proÞtability of eﬀort if and only if ∆I (φ; θ) <
γw∆π∆S + γe.
Figure 1 illustrates this implication.
These graphs give the threshold in the degree of demands over which it is no longer proÞtable
for the principal to induce eﬀort 1 (self-esteem concerns may extend eﬀort proÞtability in the
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sense that they may move this threshold to the right). Implication 1 says that employment
relations proÞtability is constrained by the characteristics of the job which needs to be carried
out. When the condition in implication 1 holds, e = 1 is induced for jobs whose "objective"
disutility exceeds the expected added surplus which eﬀort provides: that is what we mean when
talking of extended proÞtability. When it does not, the principal renounces inducing e = 1
before it is proÞtable for her to encourage intrinsic motivation. The job under consideration is
then deÞnitely unfulÞlling.
Our point was to show that beyond technologies, job characteristics and workers self-esteem
concerns interplay in the determining of the proÞtability of employment relations. This comes
from the potential stimulation of an intrinsic motivation. The question now is what if some
agents are less sensitive than others to this stimulation?
4.2 Motivation-based gains in proÞtability and selective hiring in jobs whose
monitoring is costless
Although we omitted its role in the previous step, motivation-based gains in proÞtability also
depend on individual aspects through trait θ. Some individuals are better suited to the workplace
identity than others (or, conversely, better suited to the out-of-the-workplace identity). As we
have already stated: psycho-sociological analyses reveal that, for instance, being a woman,
an old worker, having a depreciated qualiÞcation, etc. (within the framework of our model,
having a θ = 0) predisposes to the out-of-the-workplace identity (identity B). In what follows,
raising the question of selective hiring, we move gradually from the analysis of some particular
employment relation to a model of labor market functioning that stresses job characteristics. We
come to matters of earning disparities between socio-demographic groups through occupational
segregation.
Suitability of agents to the workplace identity, and selective hiring. Here, it is as-
sumed: that a principal faces a pool of agents only diﬀerentiated from each other by their trait
θ ∈ {0, 1} - (IB, wA,γ) is common to all the agents in the labour pool; that there is no shortage
of workers of any trait. Technology (π,q, S (.)) is Þxed so that we can focus on the role of job
characteristics (φ,ψ) over selective hiring.
Because some individuals feel better suited to the out-of-the-workplace identity than to the
workplace identity, they may be pushed aside by the principal: it all depends on the type of
the available job. The next implication states conditions, for some particular job, that make it
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∆I(φ;1) ≥ γw∆π∆S+γe
∆π∆S
w=ψ
e*=1
c*=B
θ* ∈ {0,1}
e*=0
c*=B, θ* ∈ {0,1}
a*= in ⇔ E0S ≥0
0 < ∆I(φ; 1) < ∆I(φ; 0) < γe 
∆π∆S
w=ψ
e*=1
c*=A
θ*=1
e*=0
c*=B, θ* ∈ {0,1}
a*=in ⇔ E0S ≥ 0
ψ
ψ
∆I(φ; 1) < ∆I(φ; 0) ≤ 0
∆π∆S
w=ψ
w=(ψ−γe)/(1+γw)
e*=1
c*=A
θ* ∈ {0,1}
e*=0
c*= A (if a*= in)
θ* ∈ {0,1}
a*= in ⇔ E0S ≥ 0
ψ
∆π∆S
w=ψ
e*=1
c*=B
θ* ∈ {0,1}
e*=1
c*=A
θ*=1
e*=0
c*=B, θ* ∈ {0,1}
a*= in ⇔ E0S ≥ 0
ψ
∆π∆S
e*=1
c*=A
θ* ∈ {0,1}
γw∆π∆S+γe > ∆I(φ; 1) > γe
Figure 2: Conditions for discrimination occurence (the role of ψ).
prejudicial to exhibit trait θ = 0. It also stresses the role of the degree of demands of jobs. Note
that ∆I (φ; 1) < ∆I (φ; 0).
Implication 2 The relative ease with which agents hold identity A or B may or not, ac-
cording to the job characteristics and technology, involve a selective hiring. More precisely,
 if ∆I (φ; 1) ≥ γw∆π∆S + γe or ∆I (φ; 0) ≤ 0 then hiring is not selective whatever
ψ > 0;
 if γw∆π∆S + γe > ∆I (φ; 1) and ∆I (φ; 0) > 0 : (i) hiring is selective for low and/or
medium degrees of demand ψ; (ii) hiring stops being selective as degree of demands ψ becomes
high.
Hence, workers whose θ = 0 may be crowded out by those whose θ = 1 despite any apparent
diﬀerences in terms of productivity. Some possible corresponding situations are depicted in
Þgure 2.
Implication 2 provides a characterization of jobs for which hiring is selective. The underlying
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argument is simple: it states that, according to job characteristics, agents exhibiting traits θ = 0
or θ = 1 can be perfect substitutes or not. Hiring is only selective if not and it has nothing to
do with employers tastes as regards individual traits.
Non-discrimination, and motivation-based gains in the proÞtability of eﬀort. Let
us stress an important property of our model which Þgure 2 illustrates. Selection may be a
requirement for the highest motivation-based gain in proÞtability.
Implication 3 (i) for ∆I (φ; 0) ≥ γe, the highest motivation-based gain in proÞtability
requires hiring selection; (ii) for γe > ∆I (φ; 0) > 0, the highest motivation-based gain in prof-
itability may require hiring selection or not, according to the jobs degree of demands; (iii) for
0 ≥ ∆I (φ; 0), the highest motivation-based gain in proÞtability does not involve any selection.
This latter implication highlights that, contrary to what holds for taste-based theories of
discrimination, there could be an incompatibility between improving the proÞtability of eﬀort,
and avoiding socio-demographic selection. As a consequence, when Þghting hiring discrimina-
tion, one should have in mind possible consequences in terms of proÞtability. In particular,
quota policies are bound to be: ineﬀective as one seeks to reduce socio-demographic disparities
(if Þrms are allowed to hire agents whose θ = 0 in the type of job they want); source of loss in
proÞtability (if the policy maker imposes the hiring of some agents whose θ = 0 in jobs that are
neither unfulÞlling to θ = 1 nor strongly fulÞlling to θ = 0).
We now turn to the analysis of some likely consequences of self-esteem concerns over the
labor market as a whole.
Self-esteem concerns and selective hiring in the labor market. While agents (labor
suppliers) are still assumed to be only diﬀerentiated from each other by θ, we comprehend labor
demand as segmented according to the characteristics of available jobs. For each technology
(π,q, S (.)) and characteristics (ψ, φ), we assume there is a unique available job: employers are
monopsonists on each segment of the labor market.33
On this basis, it is trivial that when only the agent participation is required (e = 0) hiring
will not be selective: indeed, in that case E0w∗0 (1) = E0w∗0 (0) = 0. We consider cases in which
eﬀort is induced in the next proposition.
33Beyond matters of simplicity, this assumption is made to neutralize the impact of competition over the
distribution of workers between available jobs. Supporting the relevance of such an hypothesis, see Bhaskar,
Manning, and To (2002).
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Proposition 1 Consider a job for which it is proÞtable for the principal to induce eﬀort
e = 1. Then, hiring is selective if and only if this job is either weakly fulÞlling to agents whose
θ = 1 or strongly fulÞlling to them but not to those whose θ = 0.
Proof. We show the contra-positive statement i.e. that hiring is not selective if and only if
the job is either strongly fulÞlling to agents whose θ = 0 or unfulÞlling to those whose θ = 1.
Consider a job for which hiring is not selective. It must be the case that the principal makes
an equal proÞt when hiring an θ = 1 or an θ = 0. This is true when E1w1 (0) = E1w1 (1),
that is, when the job in question is strongly fulÞlling or unfulÞlling both to an θ = 1 and to an
θ = 0. Take a job which is strongly fulÞlling (respectively unfulÞlling) both to an θ = 1 and to
an θ = 0. Then E1w1 (0) = E1w1 (1) =
ψ−γe
1+γw
(respectively E1w1 (0) = E1w1 (1) = ψ) so that
the principal makes an equal proÞt when hiring an θ = 1 or an θ = 0 and hiring is not selective.
This proposition tells us that the way workers view a given job conditions their chance of
being hired. Indeed, on this perception depends their capacity to develop intrinsic motivation
to eﬀort: that is what employers care about! These comments lead to Þgure 3 which displays,
for a given technology (π,q, S (.)), the set of jobs for which hiring is selective in the space
(φ, ψ) ⊆ R2+.34
Each point in this space represents a particular job, described as a couple (scope, degree of
demands). Our model suggests that all the jobs are not equally likely to give rise to motivation-
based selection. Selective hiring should be scarce for jobs such as, for instance, cashier or menial
bank clerk: tasks are such that, whatever θ ∈ {0, 1}, intrinsic motivation hardly balances the
need for extrinsic rewards. These cases correspond to the bottom left area of Þgure 3. In
contrast, reporters, doctors or soldiers often view their occupation as missions to be completed
rather than just as a way of earning a living. They generally enjoy wide scope and give their job
a particular importance in their personal fulÞlment. According to our model, motivation-based
selection should not arise in this kind of job because of the strong intrinsic motivation that
comes with them: so strong that it does not really matter to exhibit an θ = 0 or an θ = 1. These
cases echo the area to the right of the Þgure. All other situations between the last two sets
of cases refer to jobs that are either weakly fulÞlling to agents whose θ = 0 or to those whose
θ = 1. For these jobs, extrinsic and intrinsic motivations compete and θ makes a diﬀerence to
34This Þgure assumes IB +γw (wA −∆π∆S) > 0 and γh < γe < ∆π∆S. The latter assumption about parame-
ters is not crucial as the shape of the set of selective jobs is considered. As for the Þrst, the opposite would have
implied a vertical cut in the set of selective jobs: since it does not dramatically aﬀect the content of our analysis,
we do not consider this case graphically.
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(1+γw)∆π∆S+γe
φ
ψ
Set of jobs for 
which hiring is 
selective
∆π∆S
φ = IB+γw(wA− ∆π∆S)
IB+γwwA
φ = IB+γwwA+γe +γθ
Jobs which are 
strongly fulfilling 
both to agents whose 
θ=0 and θ=1
ψ= φ −(IB+γwwA+γθ )
γe
ψ= (IB − φ )/γw+wA
ψ= φ + (1+γw)∆π∆S −(IB+γwwA )
Jobs which are unfulfilling 
both to agents whose θ=0 
and θ=1
Effort e=1 is not induced 
by the principal
Figure 3: Jobs characteristics and selective hiring.
the principal: she targets agents who should develop the strongest intrinsic motivation.
So far, we have mostly adopted the principals perspective, stressing the proÞtability of eﬀort.
What has our model to say about earnings within each socio-demographic group?
4.3 The potential gap in average earnings
Here, we question the impact of the occupational segregation to which our analysis leads on the
average earnings of socio-demographic groups whose θ = 0 and θ = 1. In the absence of any
assumption about the distribution of jobs in the space (φ, ψ) we cannot address the question of
earnings diﬀerences nor make any prediction. Nevertheless, we would like to put forward some
properties our model exhibits. To do this we introduce a measure of potential hiring selection.
The potential share of discriminating jobs. Let λ (E1w) ∈ [0, 1] denote the potential
share of discriminating jobs among those of wage standard E1w > 0. This share is "potential"
to the extent that it is built upon the assumption that jobs are uniformly distributed over a
closed subset
h
0, φ
i
×
h
0, ψ
i
of R2+ with φ > IB+γwwA+γe+γθ and ψ > (1 + γw)∆π∆S+γe,
so that all possible situations are encompassed. These strong assumptions respond to our will
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(1+γw)∆π∆S+γe
φ
ψ
∆π∆S
φ = IB+γw(wA− ∆π∆S)
IB+γwwA
φ = IB+γwwA+γe +γθ
γe
ψ= φ + (1+γw)∆π∆S −(IB+γwwA )
E1w1* = E1w > 0
X1
X2 X4
X0
X3
IB+γwwA+γe
Figure 4: Iso-pay curve and the set of jobs for which discrimination occurs.
to display the structural implications of our model regarding earnings disparities between socio-
demographic groups.
Proposition 2 Consider the set of jobs whose monitoring is costless. Then
 λ is increasing in E1w;
 0 < λ (E1w) ≤ min
n
λ (∆π∆S) , λ
³
IB
γw
+ wA
´o
.
Proof. On the next Þgure, we draw the iso-pay curve corresponding to E1w∗1 = E1w (the
bold dotted broken line).
For 0 < E1w ≤ ∆π∆S, our measure of potential selection is simply
λ =
X1X2 +X2X3
X0X1 +X1X2 +X2X3 +X3X4
Hence, for 0 < E1w ≤ ∆π∆S, the potential share of discriminating jobs is written
λ (E1w) =

(γwE1w+γe)
√
2+γθ
(γwE1w+γe)(
√
2−1)+φ if E1w ≤
IB
γw
+ wA
(IB+γwwA+γe)
√
2+γθ
(IB+γwwA+γe)(
√
2−1)+φ if E1w >
IB
γw
+ wA
which involves the previous result.
Earnings disparity. The latter proposition states that the higher the wage standard, the
more (potentially) likely it is that a (randomly drawn) job will involve selection between θ = 0
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and θ = 1. Hence, our model leads to a possible explanation of the gap in average earnings
between socio-demographic groups that the evidence displays.35 The argument would be the
following: the proportion of agents whose θ = 1 should be higher in well paid jobs than in
poorly paid ones - at least under the assumption that there are (at least) as many θ = 0 and
θ = 1 in the two remaining sets of jobs. As a consequence, when comparing the average earnings
between socio-demographic groups, it is likely that it will be higher among θ = 1 than among
θ = 0. This corresponds to the fact that the set of jobs for which hiring is selective includes
more demanding jobs than the set of jobs that are unfulÞlling both to θ = 0 and θ = 1.
Comparative statics. Let us start with the analysis of a set of jobs with common expected
added surplus ∆π∆S. For ∆π∆S < IBγw +wA, all other things being equal, an increase in ∆π∆S
implies an extended salary range with λ higher in the top earnings: it is bound to widen the gap
in average earnings between socio-demographic groups. Once ∆π∆S is over IBγw +wA, while still
extending the salary range, the eﬀects in terms of unequal average pay of a rise in ∆π∆S are no
longer ampliÞed by an increased λ for top earnings. Hence, IBγw + wA should be comprehended
as a boundery limiting the increase of the weight of agents whose trait is θ = 1 in top earnings
when computing average pay by socio-demographic groups.
What if IB or/and wA rise? As one considers jobs whose technologies were such that, initially,
∆π∆S < IBγw
+wA, neither the salary range nor the weight of θ = 1 in top earnings are aﬀected.
Such is not the case when considering jobs whose associated initial expected added surplus was
below IBγw + wA. Then, for any given E1w initially higher than
IB
γw
+ wA, λ is increased: the
weight of θ = 1 among well-paid jobs is increased. Hence, on the whole economy scale, the
potential gap in pay between socio-demographic groups is widened by a rise in IB or wA.
Therefore, our argument is based on the relative concentration of well paid jobs in the set of
jobs for which hiring is selective. Notice that it does not involve any competitive mechanisms:
by designing a measure of "potential selective hiring" we focus on a force that is inherent in our
model (involving agents preferences). Besides, this mechanism may not operate since eﬀective
selective hiring eventually depends on assumptions over the actual distribution of jobs in the
space (φ, ψ).
In this section, while giving the implications of self-esteem concerns over employment rela-
tions for jobs whose monitoring is costless as well as potential implications over labor market
outcomes, we brought to light some forces operating whatever the observability of eﬀort: we
35See the discussion below.
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will see that most of the previous results hold when eﬀort is not observable. Let us nevertheless
turn to the problem with moral hazard, and question matters of discrimination and proÞtability
for jobs whose monitoring is not cost-eﬀective.
5 ProÞtability, and discrimination for jobs whose monitoring is
not cost-eﬀective (non-veriÞable eﬀort)
5.1 Self-esteem concerns, and optimal contracts with moral hazard
As a preamble, recall that, as holds under complete information, the contract w = 0 is necessary
and suﬃcient to induce the participation of a non-zealous agent (agent exerting e = 0) with
moral hazard. In the next claim, we describe the equilibrium of the contracting game with
moral hazard. It will be seen that ∆I, the relative reservation utility of identities A and B,
keeps playing a crucial role. We denote w-1 the contract minimizing the expected transfer while
inducing eﬀort e = 1 with moral hazard, and E1w- the corresponding expected transfer.
Claim 2 Let (φ,ψ) characterize a job (whose monitoring is not cost-eﬀective) which the prin-
cipal might like to be carried out, and (IB, wA,γ) an agents self-esteem concerns. With moral
hazard and limited liability, the contract minimizing expected transfer while inducing eﬀort is
written
w-1 =

³
0,max
n
ψ−γe
(1+γw)∆π
; 0
o´
if ∆I (φ; θ) ≤ γw1+γw
π0
∆π (ψ − γe)³
0,max
n
ψ−γe+∆I(φ;θ)
(1+γw)π1−π0 ; 0
o´
if γw1+γw
π0
∆π (ψ − γe) < ∆I (φ; θ) ≤ γw π1∆πψ + γe³
0, ψ∆π
´
otherwise
and eﬀort e = 1 is induced if and only if E1w- ≤ ∆π∆S. When eﬀort is not induced by the
principal (e = 0), participation requires a transfer of 0, and she keeps inducing it if and only if
E0S ≥ 0. Otherwise, the job is left unÞlled.
Proof. See the appendix.
With moral hazard, the principal can no longer punish a shirking agent: the contract is
only contingent upon the realization of q. Hence, inducing eﬀort e = 1 requires making the gap
between the expected payoﬀs for a zealous agent and a shirker as large as possible.
In the following, we will focus on the comparison with what we obtained for jobs whose
monitoring is costless as well as with the standard case (absence of a workplace identity). To
make clearer the connection to our previous results, let us make explicit the expected transfers
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corresponding to the contracts of the latter claim:
E1w
- =

max
n
π1
∆π
ψ−γe
1+γw
; 0
o
if ∆I (φ; θ) ≤ γw1+γw
π0
∆π (ψ − γe)
max
n
π1
∆π
³
(1+γw)∆π
(1+γw)π1−π0
´
ψ+∆I(φ;θ)−γe
1+γw
; 0
o
if γw1+γw
π0
∆π (ψ − γe) < ∆I (φ; θ) ≤ γw π1∆πψ + γe
π1
∆πψ otherwise
In this form, the connection to the standard case may seem clear. As one considers strongly
fulÞlling or unfulÞlling jobs, the impact of the unobservability of eﬀort is exactly what one
usually obtains: from what agents get under complete information, required transfers rise by
a factor π1∆π > 1 which corresponds to standard limited liability rent. This is not the case for
weakly fulÞlling jobs for which a factor (1+γw)∆π(1+γw)π1−π0 < 1 emerges that curbs the impact of the
unobservability of eﬀort. This diﬀerence echoes the fact that only for weakly fulÞlling jobs (by
deÞnition) is the crossed incentive constraint binding: but (as we will see in detail in the sequel)
the unobservability of eﬀort induces a relative relaxing of
¡
ICA/B
¢
compared to
¡
ICB/A
¢
which
curbs the increase of required expected transfer.
In fact, things are not that simple. Indeed, in the previous interpretation, we considered jobs
that kept the same type under complete and incomplete information about eﬀort: this may not
be the case as we will see below.36
As for the implications of the latter claim, the forces we described under complete information
still operate. As a result, many diﬀerences from the previous analysis are only quantitative,
leaving our generic results unchanged. One can check that this is true regarding implication 1
in particular. This results from the fact that moral hazard does not aﬀect an agents self-esteem
concerns. Hence, the wage threshold over which the agent prefers to hold the workplace identity
is the same whether eﬀort is observable or not.
But moral hazard also leads to qualitative diﬀerences from the case of jobs whose monitoring
is costless. Since with moral hazard, matters of hiring discrimination involve both quantitative
and qualitative diﬀerences, we postpone analyzing them. First, we would like to stress the
qualitative diﬀerences from what we obtained for costlessly monitored jobs: they are induced
by the fact that moral hazard may change the type of a job despite Þxed characteristics.
5.2 FulÞlling and unfulÞlling jobs with moral hazard
Formally, the main diﬀerences come from the fact that, with moral hazard, the degree of demands
ψ enters the condition that deÞnes a job as strongly fulÞlling: for ψ > γe, a job can be strongly
36The analysis of the impact of the unobservability of eﬀort in terms of eﬃciency is available upon request.
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fulÞlling although ∆I > 0⇔ IB > IA (0; θ). The recognition of ones workplace identity through
E0w > 0 leaves an A shirker relatively better oﬀ with moral hazard than under complete
information about eﬀort.
Proposition 3 Moral hazard extends the class of fulÞlling jobs.
Proof. Consider the technology (π,q, S (.)) of a job whose characteristics are given by
(φ, ψ), and an agents self-esteem concerns (IB, wA,γ) such that ∆I = γwψ + γe + ε with
0 < ε < γw
π0
∆πψ. Since ∆I > γwψ + γe, the job belongs to the class of unfulÞlling jobs under
complete information while since ∆I < γwψ+γe+γw
π0
∆πψ = γw
π1
∆πψ+γe it belongs to the class
of fulÞlling jobs with moral hazard.
Furthermore, if a job is fulÞlling under complete information then it is also fulÞlling with
moral hazard. Suppose it does not hold. Then, there would exist a technology (π,q, S (.)), job
characteristics (φ,ψ), and an agents self-esteem concerns (IB, wA,γ) such that
∆I ≤ γwψ + γe and ∆I > γw
π1
∆π
ψ + γe
which is impossible since π1 > π0 ≥ 0.
The next Þgure illustrates the latter proposition.
∆I
∆I
0
γwπ0(ψ − γe)/[(1+γw)∆π]
γwψ+ γe
γwπ1ψ/∆π+ γe
Strongly fulfilling 
jobs
Unfulfilling 
jobs
Weakly fulfilling 
jobs
Jobs whose monitoring is costless (complete information)
Jobs whose monitoring is not cost-effective (incomplete information)
Note that for ∆I ∈ £γwψ + γe; γw π1∆πψ + γe¤, an unfulÞlling job under complete information
becomes a fulÞlling one with moral hazard. This is an important point for the remaining section.
Proposition 3 suggests that moral hazard tends to make employers "enrich" (in fulÞllment
capacity) the jobs they oﬀer, that is to extend recourse to intrinsic motivation. What forces
support this consequence of moral hazard? The idea is the following. Moral hazard allows the
agent to beneÞt from a rent: whatever the identity that the principal Þnally encourages, she will
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have to concede this rent. Therefore, we are dealing with better-paid jobs (for a given degree
of demands) as moral hazard holds. Principals are then closer to the wage threshold making
it proÞtable to induce intrinsic motivation (encourage the workplace identity).37 In fact, the
extension of the class of fulÞlling jobs is an echo of the shrinking of the class of jobs for which
eﬀort e = 1 is induced (through the limited liability rent).
5.3 Self-esteem concerns, and hiring discrimination for jobs whose monitor-
ing is not cost eﬀective
How does moral hazard change matters of hiring discrimination?
Qualitative diﬀerences to the case with complete information about eﬀort. With
Þgure 5, we illustrate the role of θ directly in the case π1π0
ψ
γw
< ∆π∆S.38 The next three graphs
reveal that conditions over ∆I (φ; 0) and ∆I (φ; 1) such that hiring is selective for some values
of ψ are exactly what we obtained under complete information.
But still, these graphs also complement the four conÞgurations we analysed previously.
Let us Þrst focus on what remains unchanged. As we were saying, implication 2 (condition
of selective hiring for some ψ) and proposition 1 are still relevant for jobs whose monitoring
is not cost-eﬀective. This directly derives from the fact that implication 1 still holds with
moral hazard (that moral hazard does not aﬀect agents self-esteem concerns). Besides, the
content of the implication 3 stressing the possible incompatibility between non-discrimination
and proÞtability remains unaﬀected by the unobservability of eﬀort.
The diﬀerences come from the fact that, for large enough ψ, the principal can no longer
content herself with binding the crossed incentive constraint
¡
ICA/B
¢
: she meets the standard
incentive constraint. In other words, as the degree of demands increases, the job turns from
a weakly fulÞlling into a strongly fulÞlling one. The intuition follows. By considering more
demanding jobs, we consider higher wage standards. We eventually exceed the wage threshold
37To put it in more detail, we saw that the caring of identity A holders about the meaning of their wage (social
status) leads to a possible extra-valuation of a given wage (through parameter γw). To clarify the source of the
latter result, this must be related to the fact that, with moral hazard, the expected transfer of a shirker is strictly
positive - which was not the case under complete information. Hence, whereas the crossed incentive constraint¡
ICA/B
¢
corresponding increase is curbed by the extra-valuation of E1w,
¡
ICB/A
¢
corresponding increase is
ampliÞed by this extra-valuation (which plays over E0w):
¡
ICB/A
¢
becomes relatively more restrictive than¡
ICA/B
¢
.
38For π1π0
ψ
γw
≥ ∆π∆S graphical analysis only quantitatively diﬀers from the corresponding under complete
information.
25
∆π∆S
ψ
0 < (∆I(φ;1)−γe)/γw < π1∆I(φ;0)/(π0 γw) <
∆π∆S
e*=1
c*=B
θ∈{0,1}
e*=1
c*=A
θ=1
e*=0
c*=B
θ∈{0,1}
w=π1ψ/∆
π
w=π1(ψ−γe+∆I(φ;1))/((1+γw )π1−
π0)
w=π1(ψ−γe)/(1+γw)∆π
e*=1
c*=A
θ∈{0,1}
∆π∆S
ψ
(∆I(φ;1)−γe)/γw < 0 < π1∆I(φ;0)/(π0 γw) <
∆π∆S
e*=1
c*=A
θ=1
e*=0
c*=B
θ∈{0,1}
w=π1ψ/∆
π
w=π1(ψ−γe+∆I(φ;1))/((1+γw )π1−
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θ∈{0,1}
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Figure 5: Some new conÞgurations of hiring discrimination when eﬀort is not observable.
wA which makes an agent feel a due holder of the workplace identity (social status concern).
Added to the assumption that means of Þtting with identity A are perfect substitutes, it involves
a relative weakening of the eﬀort prescription. In other words, reaching higher wage standards
blunts the intrinsic motivation linked to the workplace identity, from which results the necessary
strengthening of the extrinsic motivation to eﬀort (increased pace of pay rising with degree of
demands).
As far as our model properties are concerned, as the left and middle Þgures show, selective
hiring may disappear although the principal keeps implementing action (in, 1, A), as the degree
of demands is increased. Indeed, as we noted above, the degree of demands ψ enters the condition
that changes a weakly fulÞlling job into a strongly fulÞlling one: once the degree of demands
is high enough so that the job is strongly fulÞlling for agents whose θ = 0, selective hiring no
longer occurs. As far as selective hiring is considered, this new mechanism leads to properties
that depart from what we obtained for jobs whose monitoring is costless.
The set of jobs for which hiring is selective. In Þgure 6, as we did under complete
information, we depict the set of jobs for which hiring is selective in the space (φ, ψ). The
dotted polygon depicts the corresponding set when eﬀort is observable.
This Þgure both illustrates the shrinking of the set of jobs for which eﬀort e = 1 is induced
(the standard loss in eﬃciency), and the distortion of the set of jobs for which hiring is selective
resulting from moral hazard. As for the latter, two facts are illustrated: some jobs that were
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(1+γw)∆π∆S+γe
φ
ψ
∆π∆S
φ = IB+γw(wA− ∆π∆S)
IB+γwwA
(1+γw)(∆π/π1)∆π∆S+γe
(∆π/π1)∆π∆S
X0 X1
X2 X3 X4
E1w
!= E1w > 0
ψ= φ −(IB+γwwA+γθ )
φ =(IB+γwwA) − γw (π1/∆π) ψ
ψ= φ + ((1+γw)+(π0/π1))∆π∆S −(IB+γwwA ) φ =(IB+γwwA+γe+γθ) − (γw π0/(1+γw )∆π) (ψ − γe)
Figure 6: Job characteristics and selective hiring with moral hazard.
unfulÞlling under complete information become weakly fulÞlling to θ = 1 (and enter the set of
jobs for which hiring is selective) with moral hazard; some jobs that were weakly fulÞlling under
complete information become strongly fulÞlling (in particular to agents whose θ = 0) with moral
hazard (and then exit the set of jobs for which hiring is selective). The intuition for the Þrst
fact is that of proposition 3: for a given degree of demands, the rent conceded by the principal
to the agent involves higher pay; thus, when eﬀort is induced, compensation is closer to wA, and
the workplace identity is encouraged for lower scope with moral hazard. As for the second fact,
it echoes the same logic, to which is added the renewed need for extrinsic motivations as the
workplace identity becomes more comfortable (high scope, and adequate pay).
Let us examine the consequences of moral hazard upon the potential gap in average earnings.
5.4 Moral hazard, and the potential gap in average earnings
Let λMH (E1w) ∈ [0, 1] denote the potential39 share of discriminating jobs among those of wage
standard E1w which involve moral hazard.
Proposition 4 Consider the set of jobs whose monitoring is not cost eﬀective. Then,
39The word "potential" involving the same set of restrictions as above.
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 All other things being equal, λMH < λ;40
 λMH is: strictly increasing in E1w over
i
0, IBγw
+ wA
i
; strictly decreasing in E1w overi
IB
γw
+wA,∆π∆S
i
.
Proof. For 0 < E1w ≤ ∆π∆S, the potential share of jobs for which hiring is selective is
written:
λMH
µ
E1w;
π1
π0
¶
=

³
γw
³
1−π0
π1
´
E1w+γe
´√
2+γθ³
γw
³
1−π0
π1
´
E1w+γe
´
(
√
2−1)+φ
if E1w ≤ IBγw + wA³
IB+γwwA+γe−γw π0π1E1w
´√
2+γθ³
IB+γwwA+γe−γw π0π1E1w
´
(
√
2−1)+φ
if E1w >
IB
γw
+ wA
which involves our claim.
Let us comment on the Þrst item of the latter proposition. It states that, all other things being
equal (in particular for a given expected transfer E1w), the potential share of discriminating
jobs is lower with moral hazard than under complete information about eﬀort. Indeed, with
moral hazard, E1w comprehends a (strictly positive) limited liability rent, which is not the case
under complete information. Thus, a given E1w > 0 corresponds to less demanding jobs with
moral hazard than under complete information. But selective hiring is all the more likely when
more demanding jobs are considered so that λMH < λ.
Earnings disparity. As regards the class of jobs whose technology is such that ∆π∆S ≤
IB
γw
+ wA, λMH is strictly increasing in E1w which reinforces what we obtained under complete
information: higher wages correspond to more demanding jobs ; the latter are more likely to
require the arousing of intrinsic motivation which feeds selective hiring. For IBγw +wA < ∆π∆S,
λMH rises in E1w up to
IB
γw
+ wA, it is then strictly decreasing in E1w. This results from the
expansion of the class of jobs that are strongly fulÞlling both to θ = 0 and θ = 1 as E1w rise: for
a given scope φ, jobs which were weakly fulÞlling to θ = 0 for low levels of E1w (of ψ) become
strongly fulÞlling for higher levels of E1w (of ψ). Therefore, as we consider the class of well-paid
jobs for which eﬀort brings high expected beneÞts, the potential share of jobs for which hiring is
selective may decrease. This implies that the over-representation of θ = 1 in the better-paid jobs
should be reduced, curbing unequal average earnings between groups. Hence, it is not within
this class of jobs that we should witness the widest gap between socio-demographic groups.
Comparative statics. As for technological aspects, it is desirable to distinguish the stochastic
productivity of eﬀort ∆π, from the non-stochastic productivity of eﬀort ∆S. Indeed, contrary
40Furthermore, limπ1
π0
→+∞ λ
MH
³
E1w;
π1
π0
´
= λ (E1w).
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to what prevailed under complete information, the consequences of a change in the productivity
of eﬀort are not the same, whether it involves a change in ∆π or in ∆S. The consequences
of a change in the latter are broadly similar to those of a change in ∆π∆S under complete
information: mainly a change in the extension of the salary range. With moral hazard, to
the extent that a change in ∆π is also a change in π1π0 , it results in diﬀerent eﬀects. Previous
expressions of λMH imply that, whatever E1w ∈ [0,∆π∆S], whatever the relative worth of
∆π∆S and IBγw +wA, a gain in π1 (given π0) increases λ
MH . Yet, this is not the only consequence
of an increase in ∆π.
The next Þgure depicts a numerical illustration.41 We draw the potential share of jobs for
which hiring is selective for two technologies: the bold curve corresponds to a stochastic pro-
ductivity of eﬀort which is higher than that corresponding to the thin curve. The dotted curve
represents the same measure under complete information.
76543210
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
Wage standard
Lambda 
Potential share of jobs for which discrimination occurs for two technologies under complete
information or with moral hazard.
Numericals are such that ∆π∆S > IBγw + wA. As mentioned above, we see that λ
MH is
higher for all wage standards below the initial ∆π∆S, which suggests a widened average pay
gap between θ = 0 and θ = 1. The ambiguity comes from the fact that the extended salary
range goes with lower potential selection in top earnings.
We now provide a discussion of our results, relating them both to available theories and to
available evidence about disparities in the labor market.42
41Self-esteem concerns are (IB, wA,γ) =
¡
3
2
, 1,
¡
1
2
, 1
2
, 1
4
¢¢
, the non-stochastic productivity of eﬀort ∆S = 30,
and the technological shock consists in a move from π =
¡
1
2
, 2
3
¢
to
¡
1
2
, 3
4
¢
. We further take φ = 7
2
.
42The next section is a short version of Baguelin (2004) which provides a more comprehensive discussion.
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6 Discussion and conclusion
Most available theoretical works addressing the problem of socio-demographic disparities in the
labor market treat various aspects of these disparities in isolation. Yet empirical studies rather
support global approaches.
6.1 Accounting for vertical occupational segregation
The major features of disparities between socio-demographic groups in the labor market are hir-
ing discrimination and occupational segregation. The distribution of employment by occupation
or sector is still very much gender-segmented. Similar evidence exists for racial diﬀerences.43
The interesting thing is that occupation segregation tends to be vertical44: this is both a doc-
umented micro reality (see Neumark (1996) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003))45,46 and
a statistical fact. These Þndings make an indirect analysis of statistical wage disparities look
particularly justiÞed: the idea is that the most signiÞcant channel to explain average earnings
disparities lies in vertical occupational segregation rather than in pure wage discrimination.
Occupational segregation might result from more severe employer discrimination in one oc-
cupation than in others. Although both statistical discrimination and taste-based theories can
predict horizontal segregation, they can hardly say where it should arise. The story involving
prejudiced co-workers is of particular interest as regards vertical occupational segregation. It
explains the "glass ceiling" impeding womens (or blacks) occupational advancement by assum-
ing that men (or whites) do not accept being ordered about by women (or blacks). But vertical
43See Gittelman & Howell (1995).
44Occupational segregation is said to be horizontal when it involves a segregated distribution of socio-
demographic groups among jobs that correspond to a given earnings standard. It is said to be vertical when
jobs under consideration diﬀer with respect to an earnings standard.
45Neumark (1996) studies sex discrimination in restaurant hiring. He Þnds that in high-priced restaurants
(where waitpersons earnings are higher), job applications from women have an estimated probability of receiving
a job oﬀer signiÞcantly lower than those from men. A key contribution of Neumark (1996) is to document micro
evidence of vertical occupational segregation by gender. In a single industry (catering), he distinguishes two
statuses: waitperson in high-priced restaurants, waitperson in low-priced restaurants. The interesting thing is
that vertical occupational segregation arises, with a majority of men working in high-priced restaurants (which
pay well), and a majority of women working in low-priced restaurant (which pay poorly). Neumark mentions
studies which conduct comparable tests for racial discrimination: it turns out that discrimination against blacks
exists in high-priced restaurants.
46Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) conduct a global study of racial discrimination in hiring. Manipulating the
perception of race (in otherwise similar resumés) by using distinctively ethnic names, they show that "callback"
rates are signiÞcantly lower for distinctively black-named applicants.
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occupational segregation does not necessarily involve hierarchical aspects, as Neumark (1996)
shows.
One can also account for occupational segregation without mobilizing hiring discrimination.
A Þrst possibility for this perspective states that group diﬀerences in pre-labor market human
capital investment and in non-labor market activities may lead to diﬀerences in comparative
advantage across occupations. This can account for both horizontal and vertical occupational
segregation. Yet the nature of the gender and racial diﬀering comparative advantage across
occupations remains unspeciÞed. Altonji and Blank (1999, p.3176) mention another possible
explanation: that members of diﬀerent groups select into diﬀerent occupations, notably because
social norms regarding appropriate occupations may diﬀer between groups. What is more,
preferences for the characteristics of occupations may diﬀer between groups, particularly men
and women. But again the very nature of these diﬀering preferences are not speciÞed. As
for gender diﬀerences, Corcoran and Courant (1985) provide some hypotheses about how sex
role socialization might aﬀect labor market outcomes. They mention four ways through which
socialization might aﬀect occupational behavior. Among them are two human capital arguments:
that socialization may lead women to be more fearful or more anxious, or less conÞdent than men;
that sex role socialization may directly aﬀect workers skills and personality traits. But they also
mention two "taste" explanations: that children may internalize traditional notions of sex roles,
accept these cultural sex stereotypes as fact, and eventually choose occupations that conform
to these stereotypes; that sex role socialization may aﬀect the values men and women attach
to diﬀerent activities so that workers of both sexes tend to value "sex appropriate" activities.
In fact, comparable arguments could be invoked as regards racial diﬀerences as suggested in
Akerlof and Kranton (2000). We believe our argument consistently connects with these latter
intuitions.
6.2 A motivation-based theory of selective hiring which generates statistical
earnings disparities
In our analysis, agents decide whether to achieve self-esteem through their job or through other
activities outside their working life. Certain individual traits restrict this choice since the com-
fortable holding of the workplace identity requires the agent to Þt in with some ideal attributes.
According to the Þeld studies we mentioned above, the ideal attributes when one holds the work-
place identity are to be a white middle-aged man with a considered-as-proper initial education,
devoid of strong commitments outside ones working life. As a consequence, all other things
31
being equal, agents exhibiting traits which match this portrait should choose the workplace
identity (and hence, develop intrinsic motivation to eﬀort) for lower wage amounts than others.
If the oﬀered job characteristics make it proÞtable to encourage the workplace identity, employ-
ers will hire the former Þrst (at the expense of the others). It is noteworthy that in our model,
selective hiring is not independent of technological or organizational aspects (there is no arbi-
trary behavior from employers): the characteristics of jobs under consideration determine how
likely selective hiring is and, consequently, occupational segregation should reßect diﬀerences in
job characteristics.
From the perspective of our model, the basic interpretation of Bertrand and Mullainathans
(2003) Þndings would be that being black moves an individuals traits further from the ideal
attributes associated with the workplace identity. Assuming a particular concentration of jobs
whose characteristics make them at most (or at least) weakly fulÞlling to a black (or to a white),
whites are expected to develop stronger intrinsic motivation so that it is rational of employers
to favor their applications. Our interpretation of Neumarks conclusions would suggest that
catering occupations do not use the same job characteristics, whether one considers low-priced
restaurants or high-priced ones. Working as a waitperson in the latter brings wider scope but
is likely to be more demanding than in low-priced restaurants insofar as the quality of the meal
service is then crucial (higher price often corresponds to higher demands for service quality):
catering jobs in luxury restaurants are presumed to be at least weakly fulÞlling to a man but at
most weakly fulÞlling to a woman. The higher capacity of men to develop intrinsic motivation
as waiters in establishments where meal service is formal encourages managers to give them an
advantage over women.
From the building of the set of jobs for which hiring is selective within the space (scope, degree
of demands), we give some potential consequences of the particular occupational segregation we
obtained, in terms of unequal earnings between socio-demographic groups. The gap in average
earnings (favorable to agents who Þt in) may be a consequence of the fact that the potential
share of jobs for which hiring is selective increases as expected pay increases: selective hiring is
more likely in the class of well-paid jobs than in the class of poorly paid ones. Why is it so?
Because pay increases according to the degree of demands, and the more demanding a job, the
stronger the propensity of employers to try arousing intrinsic motivations (i.e. the workplace
identity): it is precisely on that ground that selection takes place in our analysis. All things
considered, our explanation of earnings disparities (as a macro statistical fact) is very simple:
women and blacks earn less than white men because they are relatively more concentrated into
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less demanding occupations.
An important aspect of socio-demographic earnings disparities is that they are lasting.47
Hence the question: how lasting are the gaps in average earnings our model generates? To be
long lasting, selection should increase proÞt or non-discrimination be costly. This is precisely
the case in our model. We obtain an unambiguous increase in proÞts associated with selection
when it takes place. Moreover, our argument for this result seems more cross-occupational than
existing alternatives allowing higher proÞts to discriminating employers, which is consistent with
Mullainathan and Bertrands (2003) Þndings showing that the amount of (seeming) discrimi-
nation looks uniform across occupations and industries. What matter from a motivation-based
perspective are the job characteristics (whether or not these characteristics make it proÞtable
for the employer to encourage the workplace identity). The class of jobs for which hiring is
selective is likely to be uniformly distributed across industries and we see no reason supporting
the assumption that such jobs should disappear in the long run.
6.3 Concluding remarks
Although motivational aspects are sometimes invoked in the literature about the gaps in earnings
between socio-demographic groups, few theoretical works have shed light on the problem. Our
analysis suggests that, for some jobs whose characteristics are speciÞed, black or female workers48
could manifest lower motivation at work than white men as a consequence of diverging strategies
of identity building. This is the core insight of the present analysis. We derived from this micro
analysis consequences as regards labor market outcomes, suggesting that earnings gaps between
socio-demographic groups could correspond to the fact that the share of jobs for which hiring is
selective was increasing with the earnings standard considered.
As regards policy implications, we would argue that our model suggests two ways to ho-
mogenize the opportunities in the labor market. The Þrst is to shape jobs so that they become
unfulÞlling to members of the majority group: this corresponds to an economy with a very
high level of labor division, leaving individuals with little scope at work. Although hiring se-
lection would then disappear, economic eﬃciency would be severely compromised since intrinsic
motivations that individuals could develop in the workplace would never be encouraged. The
alternative way is obviously the better. It advises shaping as many jobs as possible so that
47See Arrow (1998).
48We did not focus on this above, but our approach applies to the issues of age discrimination - Lobel and St.
Clair (1992) report Þnding that age had a negative eﬀect on merit increases, despite having no signiÞcant eﬀect
on eﬀort.
33
they be strongly fulÞlling to members of the minority group. This would lead both to a gain in
fairness and to more proÞt.
Our approach could shed light on other empirical issues or, at least, feed non-standard
perspectives. There exists a large literature studying the consequences of societies relationship
to leisure, comparing "labor societies" to "leisure societies". The comparative statics about
changes in IB yield possibly interesting intuitions (leisure societies being understood as ones
with high average value of IB): how do diﬀerent levels of IB aﬀect possible disparities in the
labor market? What about the link between a collective taste for leisure and earnings? What
impact in terms of eﬃciency? We provide a new route to the study of such questions.
Anyway, the would-be predictions of our model as regards labor market outcomes remain
questionable since they assume a rigid monopsonic structure (our model focuses on the het-
erogeneity in the characterization of jobs). We believe that this assumption could be relaxed
without radically amending the results we display above, but this remains to be shown: an im-
portant improvement would be to apply the insight of this paper to a more relevant framework
(labor market in monopsonic competition). Additionally, other improvements would be required
(notably the endogeneisation of the standard wA) that we leave for future research.
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A Appendix
The payoﬀs of the agent are
UoutB (w, 0; θ) = IB > 0
UoutA (w, 0; θ) = I
out
A (θ) < 0
EUB (w, 0; θ) = E0w + IB
EUA (w, 0; θ) = (1 + γw)E0w + IA (0; θ)
EUB (w, 1; θ) = E1w − ψ + IB
EUA (w, 1; θ) = (1 + γw)E1w − ψ + IA (1; θ)
Observing the contract oﬀered by the principal, the agent selects a best reply in A. Denote
Wc (e; θ) the set of contracts implementing (in, e) at least from an agent holding identity c, given
θ. Suppose Þrst that ∆π∆S < E1w so that the principal decides not to induce eﬀort e = 1.
The question of participation remains raised. The agent at least participates if w ∈Wc (0; θ)
for c = A or c = B. Since the level of eﬀort is not at stake, the contract is simply contingent
upon q i.e. it is a couple (w,w), andWc (0; θ) ⊂ R2.
w ∈WA (0; θ)⇔ EUA (w, 0; θ) ≥ UoutB (0; θ)⇔ (1 + γw)E0w + IA (0; θ) ≥ IB.
w ∈WB (0; θ)⇔ EUB (w, 0; θ) ≥ UoutB (0; θ)⇔ E0w + IB ≥ IB
Claim 0With limited liability, the contract transfering 0 to the agent whatever the realization
of q, induces his participation for a zero-eﬀort. Furthermore
c∗ =
 A if ∆I (φ) ≤ 0B otherwise
Proof. Since liability is limited, the principal chooses the contract w that solves
minwE0w
s.t. w ∈ (WA (0; θ) ∪WB (0; θ)) ∩R2+
It is straightforward to see that for E0w = 0 an agent with identity B participates. When
IA (0; θ) ≥ IB (⇔ ∆I ≤ 0), self-esteem concerns lead the agent to hold identity A which involves
a higher self-esteem than the B.
Notice that the problem of inducing the agent participation arises in exactly similar terms
under complete or incomplete information. Hence, in both cases, assuming that inducing the
eﬀort is too costly for the principal, participation will nonetheless be induced if and only if
E0S ≥ 0.
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A.1 Optimal contracts under complete information
Suppose that the principal tries to induce e = 1. We successively deÞne the sets of incentive
feasible contracts inducing eﬀort from agent with identity A and B.
w ∈WA (1; θ) ⊂ R4 if and only if
EUA (w, 1; θ) ≥ EUA (w, 0; θ) ⇔ (1 + γw)E1w1 − ψ + IA (1; θ) ≥ (1 + γw)E0w0 + IA (0; θ)
EUA (w, 1; θ) ≥ EUB (w, 0; θ) ⇔ (1 + γw)E1w1 − ψ + IA (1; θ) ≥ E0w0 + IB
EUA (w, 1; θ) ≥ UoutB (w, 0; θ) ⇔ (1 + γw)E1w1 − ψ + IA (1; θ) ≥ IB
w ∈WB (1; θ) ⊂ R4 if and only if
EUB (w, 1; θ) ≥ EUB (w, 0; θ) ⇔ E1w1 − ψ + IB ≥ E0w0 + IB
EUB (w, 1; θ) ≥ EUA (w, 0; θ) ⇔ E1w1 − ψ + IB ≥ (1 + γw)E0w0 + IA (0; θ)
EUB (w, 1; θ) ≥ UoutB (w, 0; θ) ⇔ E1w1 − ψ + IB ≥ IB
Since liability is limited, the principal chooses the contract w that solves
minw E1w1
s.t. w ∈ (WA (1; θ) ∪WB (1; θ)) ∩R4+
Claim 1 Optimal transfers under complete information.
Proof. Notice Þrst that, since both the agent and the principal are risk-neutral, only
expected transfers matter i.e. we are looking for a couple of expected transfers (E0w0, E1w1)
solving the latter program. Since the contract can be contingented upon e, a Þrst step for the
principal is to make the outside options (options that involve e = 0) as unrewarding as possible.
Limited liability constraints prevent her from pushing corresponding transfers below 0. Hence,
the strongest possible punishment entails E0w∗0 = 0 so that
w ∈WA (1; θ)⇔ (1 + γw)E1w1 − ψ + IA (1; θ) ≥ max {IA (0; θ) , IB}
and
w ∈WB (1; θ)⇔ E1w1 − ψ + IB ≥ max {IB, IA (0; θ)}
The most demanding constraint is obviously binding in the optimum. Taking into account
limited liability constraints, the lowest expected transfer inducing eﬀort is written as
E1w
∗
1 = max
½
min
½
ψ +max {IA (0; θ) , IB}− IA (1; θ)
1 + γw
;ψ +max {IB, IA (0; θ)}− IB
¾
; 0
¾
Hence, if IA (0; θ) ≥ IB (> 0) (that is ∆I ≤ 0), since IA (1; θ) = IA (0; θ) + γe,
E1w
∗
1 = max
½
min
½
ψ − γe
1 + γw
;ψ + IA (0; θ)− IB
¾
; 0
¾
= max
½
ψ − γe
1 + γw
; 0
¾
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while for IA (0; θ) < IB that is ∆I > 0, we get
E1w
∗
1 = max
½
min
½
ψ + IB − IA (1; θ)
1 + γw
;ψ
¾
; 0
¾
=
 max
n
ψ+∆I−γe
1+γw
; 0
o
if γwψ + γe > ∆I
ψ otherwise
The remaining of the proof derives from claim 0.
A.2 Optimal contracts with moral hazard
With moral hazard, the principal can no longer make transfers depending on e: w0 = w1 = w
and w0 = w1 = w. This aﬀects the set of incentive feasible contracts in the following way:
w ∈WinA (1; θ) ⊂ R2 if and only if
(1 + γw)E1w − ψ + IA (1; θ) ≥ (1 + γw)E0w + IA (0; θ) (ICA)
(1 + γw)E1w − ψ + IA (1; θ) ≥ E0w + IB
¡
ICA/B
¢
(1 + γw)E1w − ψ + IA (1; θ) ≥ IB (PCA)
w ∈WinB (1; θ) ⊂ R2 if and only if
E1w − ψ + IB ≥ E0w + IB (ICB)
E1w − ψ + IB ≥ (1 + γw)E0w + IA (0; θ)
¡
ICB/A
¢
E1w − ψ + IB ≥ IB (PCB)
and the problem writes
minwE1w
s.t. w ∈ ¡WinA (1; θ) ∪WinB (1; θ)¢ ∩R2+
The solutions of this program can no more be reduced to a couple of expected transfers. As
a consequence, it is more convenient to work with variables w and ∆w = w−w. A reformulation
of incentives feasible sets is then required that we propose in the remaining. We will solve this
program in three steps: (1) assuming that the solution involves the arousing of identity A; (2)
assuming that the solution involves the arousing of identity B; (3) on the ground of the previous
steps, making explicit conditions such that one identity is actually encouraged in the optimum.
A.2.1 The lowest expected transfer inducing e = 1 and identity A
w ∈WinA (1; θ) ∩ R2+ if and only if
∆w ≥ ψ−γe(1+γw)∆π (ICA)
w + (1+γw)π1−π0γw ∆w ≥
ψ+∆I−γe
γw
¡
ICA/B
¢
w + π1∆w ≥ ψ+∆I−γe1+γw (PCA)
w ≥ 0 and w +∆w ≥ 0 (LLC)
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and the problem writes
min
(w,∆w)
w + π1∆w s.t. (ICA) ,
¡
ICA/B
¢
, (PCA) , (LLC)
Lemma 1 The contract solving the previous problem is such that ∆w ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction.
Suppose there exists an optimum such that ∆w < 0 (and w > 0 since (LLC) is satisÞed).
In that case, (PCA) would be relaxed. Indeed, if ψ +∆I − γe ≥ 0, ∆w < 0 implies
w + π1∆w > w +
(1 + γw)π1 − π0
γw
∆w ≥ ψ +∆I − γe
γw
≥ ψ +∆I − γe
1 + γw
i.e.
¡
ICA/B
¢⇒ (PCA), while if ψ +∆I − γe < 0, ∆w < 0 implies
w + π1∆w > w +∆w ≥ 0 ≥ ψ +∆I − γe
1 + γw
i.e. (LLC)⇒ (PCA). Hence, consider the variation d∆w ∈ ]0;−∆w[ and dw such that
dw = −min
½
min
½
(1 + γw)π1 − π0
γw
; 1
¾
d∆w;w
¾
If min
n
(1+γw)π1−π0
γw
; 1
o
d∆w ≤ w, one obtains
d
µ
w +
(1 + γw)π1 − π0
γw
∆w
¶
=
µ
(1 + γw)π1 − π0
γw
−min
½
(1 + γw)π1 − π0
γw
; 1
¾¶
d∆w ≥ 0
and
d (w +∆w) =
µ
1−min
½
(1 + γw)π1 − π0
γw
; 1
¾¶
d∆w ≥ 0
so that the couple of variations (d∆w, dw) does not involve any violation of
¡
ICA/B
¢
or (LLC)
while it relaxes (ICA). Nevertheless,
d (w + π1∆w) =
µ
π1 −min
½
(1 + γw)π1 − π0
γw
; 1
¾¶
d∆w < 0
that is, the expected transfer is reduced which contradicts our initial assumption.
If min
n
(1+γw)π1−π0
γw
; 1
o
d∆w > w, the couple of variations (w,−w) leaves all the constraints
non violated. However,
d (w + π1∆w) = −w + π1w < 0
which contradicts our initial assumption.
The previous lemma implies that the solution to our problem also solves
min
(w,∆w)
w + π1∆w s.t. (ICA) ,
¡
ICA/B
¢
, (PCA) , w ≥ 0 and ∆w ≥ 0
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As a preamble to what follows, notice that for ∆w ≥ 0, since γw > 0 and π1 > ∆π >
0, if
¡
ICA/B
¢
is satisÞed then (PCA) is satisÞed. Let wA1 =
¡
wA1 , w
A
1
¢
denotes the contract
implementing eﬀort e = 1 that encourages A, and minimizes the expected transfer.
Claim With moral hazard and limited liability, the contract minimizing the expected transfer
inducing identity A, and eﬀort e = 1 entails:
wA1 =

³
0,max
n
ψ−γe
(1+γw)∆π
; 0
o´
if ∆I ≤ γw1+γw
π0
∆π (ψ − γe)³
0,max
n
ψ−γe+∆I
(1+γw)π1−π0 ; 0
o´
otherwise
Proof. The case γe < ψ.
First suppose that ψ−γe(1+γw)∆π ≥
ψ−γe+∆I
(1+γw)π1−π0 . We conjecture that (LLC) and (ICA) are the
only relevant constraints. Of course, since the principal is willing to minimize the payments
made to the agent, both constraints must be binding. Hence, wA1 = 0 and w
A
1 =
ψ−γe
(1+γw)∆π
. We
check that
¡
ICA/B
¢
is satisÞed since:
(1 + γw)π1 − π0
γw
ψ − γe
(1 + γw)∆π
≥ (1 + γw)π1 − π0
γw
ψ − γe +∆I
(1 + γw)π1 − π0
=
ψ − γe +∆I
γw
For ψ−γe(1+γw)∆π <
ψ−γe+∆I
(1+γw)π1−π0 , we conjecture that (LLC) and
¡
ICA/B
¢
are the only relevant
constraints. Both these constraints must be binding in the optimum so that wA1 = 0 and
wA1 =
ψ−γe+∆I
(1+γw)π1−π0 . Constraint (PCA) is then satisÞed since
π1∆w =
ψ +∆I − γe
1 + γw − π0π1
>
ψ +∆I − γe
1 + γw
In the case γe ≥ ψ, ∆w ≥ 0 ⇒ (ICA). We minimize the expected transfer subject to¡
ICA/B
¢
, (LLC) and ∆w ≥ 0. It is then clear that, in the optimum, w = 0, which leads to
wA1 = ∆w = max
½
ψ +∆I − γe
(1 + γw)π1 − π0
; 0
¾
We can now move on to the next step.
A.2.2 The lowest expected transfers inducing e = 1 and identity B
The limited liability condition w ≥ 0⇒ E0w ≥ 0 so that (ICB) implies (PCB). Hence, the set
WinB (1, θ) ∩ R2+ can be restricted to (and reformulated as) contracts (w,∆w) that satify
∆w ≥ ψ∆π (> 0) (ICB)
w − π1−(1+γw)π0γw ∆w ≤
∆I−ψ
γw
¡
ICB/A
¢
w ≥ 0 (LLC)
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and the problem writes
min
(w,∆w)
w + π1∆w s.t. (ICB) ,
¡
ICB/A
¢
, (LLC)
As a preamble, we must state conditions garantyingWinB (1; θ) ∩ R2+ non-emptiness.
Lemma 2
W inB (1; θ) ∩ R2+ 6= ∅⇔
n
either γw
π0
∆π
ψ ≤ ∆I or π1 > (1 + γw)π0
o
We denote C this condition.
Proof. i) Suppose π1 > (1 + γw)π0.
If −π1−(1+γw)π0γw
ψ
∆π ≤ ∆I−ψγw then
³
0, ψ∆π
´
obviously satisÞes (LLC),
¡
ICB/A
¢
and (ICB).
Hence
³
0, ψ∆π
´
∈WinB (1; θ) ∩ R2+ 6= ∅.
If −π1−(1+γw)π0γw
ψ
∆π >
∆I−ψ
γw
³
⇔ ψ−∆Iπ1−(1+γw)π0 >
ψ
∆π
´
then
³
0, ψ−∆Iπ1−(1+γw)π0
´
∈WinB (1; θ)∩R2+.
Indeed, (LLC) and (ICB) are obviously satisÞed and
−π1 − (1 + γw)π0
γw
ψ −∆I
π1 − (1 + γw)π0
=
∆I − ψ
γw
≤ ∆I − ψ
γw
so that
¡
ICB/A
¢
is satisÞed.
ii) Suppose π1 ≤ (1 + γw)π0.
Then, w ∈ WinB (1; θ) ∩ R2+ ⇒ w + (1+γw)π0−π1γw ∆w ≤
∆I−ψ
γw
. Furthermore, w ≥ 0 and
∆w ≥ ψ∆π imply
w +
(1 + γw)π0 − π1
γw
∆w ≥ (1 + γw)π0 − π1
γw
ψ
∆π
hence
(1 + γw)π0 − π1
γw
ψ
∆π
≤ ∆I − ψ
γw
⇔ γw
π0
∆π
ψ ≤ ∆I
If γw
π0
∆πψ ≤ ∆I then
³
0, ψ∆π
´
∈WinB (1; θ) ∩ R2+ 6= ∅.
Let wB1 =
¡
wB1 , w
B
1
¢
denotes the contract inducing eﬀort that encourages identity B, and
minimizes the expected transfer.
Claim Assuming that C holds, with moral hazard and limited liability, the contract minimiz-
ing the expected transfer inducing identity B, and eﬀort e = 1 entails:
wB1 =

³
0, ψ−∆Iπ1−(1+γw)π0
´
if ∆I < γw
π0
∆πψ³
0, ψ∆π
´
otherwise
Proof. We easily prove that wB1 = 0. Indeed, if w
B
1 was strictly positive then, by reducing
it we could relax constraints
¡
ICB/A
¢
, and still reduce the expected transfer.
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For γw
π0
∆πψ ≤ ∆I
³
⇔ ψ−∆Iπ1−(1+γw)π0 ≤
ψ
∆π
´
, since wB1 = 0, (ICB) ⇒ (ICB/A). Since in the
optimum (ICB) is binding, wB1 =
³
0, ψ∆π
´
.
For γw
π0
∆πψ > ∆I
³
⇔ ψ−∆Iπ1−(1+γw)π0 >
ψ
∆π
´
,WinB (1; θ)∩R2+ 6= ∅⇔ π1 > (1 + γw)π0 (see the
lemma 2). If this latter condition holds, since wB1 = 0, (ICB/A) ⇒ (ICB). Of course, in the
optimum, (ICB/A) is binding so that wB1 =
³
0, ψ−∆Iπ1−(1+γw)π0
´
.
We can move on to our last step leading to optimal contract.
A.2.3 The principals choice
The principal encourages identity that minimizes expected transfer implementing eﬀort e = 1.
We denote w-1 = (w
-
1, w
-
1) the contract inducing eﬀort that minimizes the expected transfer.
Whatever the encouraged identity, the wage in the bad state of nature (q = q) is 0 - the limited
liability constraint is binding. In the good state of nature, the principal encourages the identity
that requires the least transfer
w-1 =
 min
©
wA1 , w
B
1
ª
wheneverWinB (1; θ) ∩ R2+ 6= ∅
wA1 otherwise
Claim 2 Optimal tranfers with moral hazard.
Proof. We have already shown that wA1 = max
n
ψ+∆I−γe
(1+γw)π1−π0 ,
ψ−γe
(1+γw)∆π
, 0
o
.
 Suppose Þrst that (1 + γw)π0 < π1 so thatWinB (1, θ) ∩ R2+ 6= ∅.
For γw
π0
∆πψ ≤ ∆I, wB1 = ψ∆π and γw1+γw
π0
∆π (ψ − γe) < ∆I so that wA1 = ψ+∆I−γe(1+γw)π1−π0 . Hence,
w-1 = min
n
ψ+∆I−γe
(1+γw)π1−π0 ,
ψ
∆π
o
. ψ+∆I−γe(1+γw)π1−π0 >
ψ
∆π ⇔ ∆I > γw π1∆πψ + γe. Then
w-1 =

ψ+∆I−γe
(1+γw)π1−π0 if ∆I ≤ γw
π1
∆πψ + γe
ψ
∆πotherwise
For γw
π0
∆πψ > ∆I, w
B
1 =
ψ−∆I
π1−(1+γw)π0 .
If γw1+γw
π0
∆π (ψ − γe) ≥ ∆I then wA1 = ψ−γe(1+γw)∆π . Hence, w
-
1 = min
n
ψ−γe
(1+γw)∆π
, ψ−∆Iπ1−(1+γw)π0
o
.with
ψ−γe
(1+γw)∆π
≤ ψ−∆Iπ1−(1+γw)π0 ⇔
π1
∆π (ψ − γe) ≥ 1+γwγw (∆I − γe). Moreover, since π0 < π1,
π0
∆π (ψ − γe) ≥
1+γw
γw
∆I ⇒ π1∆π (ψ − γe) ≥ 1+γwγw (∆I − γe) so that w
-
1 =
ψ−γe
(1+γw)∆π
.
If γw1+γw
π0
∆π (ψ − γe) < ∆I then wA1 = ψ+∆I−γe(1+γw)π1−π0 . Hence, w
-
1 = min
n
ψ+∆I−γe
(1+γw)π1−π0 ,
ψ−∆I
π1−(1+γw)π0
o
.
ψ+∆I−γe
(1+γw)π1−π0 ≥
ψ−∆I
π1−(1+γw)π0 ⇔
¡
2 π0∆π + 1
¢
ψ ≤
³
2 1γw
+ 1
´
∆I +
³
π0
∆π − 1γw
´
γe. But,
Þrst: (1 + γw)π0 < π1 and γe > 0⇒
³
π0
∆π − 1γw
´
γe < 0
second: γw
π0
∆πψ > ∆I ⇒ 2 π0∆πψ > 2∆Iγw
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third: γw
π0
∆πψ > ∆I and (1 + γw)π0 < π1 ⇒ ψ > ∆I.
So that
¡
2 π0∆π + 1
¢
ψ >
³
2 1γw
+ 1
´
∆I +
³
π0
∆π − 1γw
´
γe, and w
-
1 =
ψ+∆I−γe
(1+γw)π1−π0 .
 Suppose now that (1 + γw)π0 ≤ π1 so thatWinB (1, θ) ∩R2+ can be empty.
For γw
π0
∆πψ < ∆I, w
B
1 =
ψ
∆π and
π0
∆π (ψ − γe) < 1+γwγw ∆I so that w
A
1 =
ψ+∆I−γe
(1+γw)π1−π0 . Hence,
w-1 = min
n
ψ+∆I−γe
(1+γw)π1−π0 ,
ψ
∆π
o
a case we have already consider.
For γw
π0
∆πψ ≥ ∆I,WinB (1, θ) ∩R2+ = ∅. Hence w-1 = wA1 .
 The remaining derives from claim 0.
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